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1

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
T. ROBERT CORDNER and GLORIA
CORDNER,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

Case No. 960585-CA

DARREL L. ROSS and CLELLA C.
ROSS,

Priority No. 2

Defendants and Appellees.
Appellants' Brief
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter in
accordance with Article VIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution
and Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(j) (1994 as Amended).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues on appeal all relate to the trial court's action
in granting the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Appellants

contend

that

the

trial

court

committed

error

The
in

granting the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and relies
upon the following lines of reasoning to support their position.
1.

The Trial Court Committed Error in Ruling, as a Matter
of Law that there were no Justiciable Issues of Fact
and that the Defendants were Entitled to Judgment as a
Matter of Law.

The Appellants

preserved

the issue in the Memoranda

and

affidavits submitted in opposition to the Defendantsf Motion for
Summary Judgment (R. 38-62; 63-64; 65-81; 261-280).
On appeal, this Court, in determining the propriety of the
trial court's action in granting a motion for summary judgment,
views the

facts and inferences therefrom

in a light most

favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.

Because

summary judgments are decided as questions of law, the Appellate
Court accords no deference to the trial court's determination
and reviews the issues under a correctness standard.

Taylor v.

Oqden City School District, 303 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (Utah 1996);
Viking Insurance Co. v. Coleman, 303 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (Utah
1996); Glover v. Boy Scouts of America, 299 Utah Adv. Rep. 10
(Utah 1996).
2.

The Trial Court Committed Error in Ruling, as a Matter
of Law, that the Applicable Statute of Limitations
Began to Run in July of 1984 and Expired Before the
Filing of the Plaintiffs' Complaint.

The Appellants preserved the issue in the Memoranda and
affidavits submitted in opposition to the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment (R. 38-62; 63-64; 65-81; 261-280).
Summary judgment is only proper when no genuine issue of
material

fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.

Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure; Winegar v. Froerer, Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107
(Utah 1991).

Because a challenge for summary judgment requires

only a review of questions of law, the Appellate Court accords no
particular deference to the trial court's conclusions but reviews
them for correctness.

Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., 814 P.2d 1108,
2

1111-12 (Utah 1991).
The Defendants in this case bear the burden of proving every
element necessary to establish that the statute of limitations
barred the Plaintiffs' claim.

Seale v. Gowens, 923 P.2d

1361

(Utah 1996).
3.

Judge John R. Anderson Committed Error in Granting
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Which had
Previously been Denied by Judge Payne.

The Appellants preserved

the issue in the Memoranda

and

affidavits submitted in opposition to the Defendants1 Motion for
Summary Judgment (R. 38-62; 63-64; 65-81; 261-280).
On appeal, this Court, in determining the propriety of the
trial court's action in granting a motion for summary judgment,
views

the

favorable

facts
to

and

the

inferences

party

opposing

therefrom
summary

in

a

light

judgment.

most

Because

summary judgments are decided as questions of law, the Appellate
Court accords no deference to the trial court's

determination

and reviews the issues under a correctness standard.

Taylor v.

Ogden City School District, 303 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (Utah 1996);
Viking

Insurance

Co. v.

Coleman, 303 Utah Adv. Rep. 5

(Utah

1996); Glover v. Boy Scouts of America, 299 Utah Adv. Rep. 10
(Utah 1996).
The "law of the case" doctrine embodies the principle that a
court should not reconsider or overrule a decision made by a coequal court.

Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Inc., 692 P.2d

735-36 (Utah 1984).
DISPOSITIVE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
3

In relevant part, Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure provides as follows:
The motion shall be served at least 10 days before
the time

fixed

for the hearing.

The adverse

party

prior to the day of the hearing may serve opposing
affidavits.

The judgment sought shall be rendered

forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material of fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law . . . . (Emphasis added).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

The Plaintiffs

filed

this action seeking to enforce

the

terms of two Uniform Real Estate Contracts, dated June 10, 1981
and

December

27,

1982.

The

derogation of the Plaintiffs1
Defendants,

without

Plaintiffs

contend,

that

in

rights under the contracts, the

attempting

to terminate

the

contractual

relationship with the Plaintiffs, sold the property, which was
the

subject

of

the

contracts

between

the parties, to

third

parties.
B.
1.

Procedural Chronology of the Case.
The Complaint was filed on August 21, 1991

(R. 1-11),

and the Defendants' Answer was filed with the Court on December
9, 1991 (R. 16-24).
4

2.
Summary

On May

15, 1992, the Defendants

Judgment with

Plaintiffs

submitted

supporting Memoranda
their

Memorandum

filed

a Motion

(R. 36-62).

in Opposition

to

for
The
the

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on June 15, 1992 (R. 6581).

On September 25, 1992, Judge A. Lynn Payne rendered his

decision, denying the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R.
85-88).
3.

The Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint was filed on October

15, 1993 (R. 167-182) and the Defendants' Answer to the Amended
Complaint was filed on November 8, 1993 (183-192).
4.

The Defendants filed their second Motion for Summary

Judgment with supporting Memoranda and affidavit on May 15, 1996
(R.

198-252).

The

Plaintiffs

filed

their

Memorandum

in

Opposition to the Defendants' second Motion for Summary Judgment
on June 4, 1996 (R. 261-280).

The Defendants' Reply Memorandum

was filed on June 14, 1996 (285-286).
5.

Judge John R. Anderson signed the Order granting the

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on July 15, 1996 and the
same was filed on July 17, 1996 (R. 304-305).
C.
1.

Statement of Facts.
The Plaintiff T. Robert Cordner resides in Utah County

and, as an occupation, operates three service stations

(Robert

Cordner deposition of 2/3/92 at 3-4 [hereinafter referred to as
R.C. deposition]).
2.

The Plaintiff, Mr. Cordner, had known the

Darrel L. Ross for approximately ten years.
5

Defendant

The Defendant, Mr.

Ross, had been a regular customer in the Orem service station
operated by the Plaintiff, Robert Cordner

(R.C. deposition of

2/3/92 at 5 ) .
3.

The Defendant, Darrel Ross informed the Plaintiff that

he had a piece of vacant property for sale in the Roosevelt area
and asked the Plaintiff Cordner if he was interested in looking
at the parcel (R.C. deposition of 2/3/92 at 6 ) .
4.

The Plaintiff, after visiting the site on at least two

occasions, entered into negotiations with the Defendant, Darrel
L. Ross (R.C. deposition of 2/3/92 at 7-8).
5.

The Plaintiff, T. Robert Cordner became interested in

purchasing the subject property based upon the Defendant Darrel
Ross' representation that he was going to build a restaurant and
motel on adjoining property.

Based upon that representation, the

Plaintiff was interested in purchasing the offered piece to build
a truck stop (R.C. deposition of 2/3/92 at 8-10).
6.
Uniform
sell

On

or

about

June

10,

1981, the

parties

executed

Real Estate Contract wherein the Defendants

two

acres of property

$40,000.00.

to the Plaintiffs

agreed

for the

an
to

sum of

In addition, the Uniform Real Estate Contract gave

the Plaintiffs an option or first right of refusal to purchase an
additional

acre

from

the

Defendants

(Uniform

Real

Estate

Real

Estate

Contract, Addendum, Exhibit " A " ) .
7.

Pursuant

to

the

terms

of

the

Uniform

Contract of June 10, 1981, the Plaintiffs were to pay $2,000.00
down with

an additional

$8,000.00 to be paid by September
6

1,

1981.

The Contract then required annual payments of $6,000.00

plus interest on June 10 of each year commencing June of 1982 for
a period of five years (Uniform Real Estate Contract, Addendum,
Exhibit "A").
8.

On or about December 27, 1982, the parties executed an

Uniform Real Estate Contract wherein the Plaintiffs agreed to
sell to the Defendants an additional acre of land for the sum of
$20,000.00.

The Plaintiffs were to pay $5,000.00 down with an

additional

$3,000.00 to be paid by January 31, 1984 with

interest.

Annual payments of $3,000.00 were to be made on

January 31 of each year for a period of five years with accrued
interest (Uniform Real Estate Contract dated 12/27/82, Addendum,
Exhibit "B").
9.

The Plaintiffs paid the following

amounts on the

Contracts with the Defendants:
DATE

AMOUNT

6/81
9/81
7/12/82
8/3/82
1/25/83
6/17/83
7/25/83
8/4/83
1/6/84
2/16/84
3/2/84
3/28/84
4/6/84
11/30/84

$2,000.00
$8,000.00
$2,500.00
$2,500.00
$5,000.00
$2,880.00
$3,000.00
$3,000.00
$ 191.77
$1,500.00
$1,500.00
$1,000.00
$ 800.00
$ 211.69

Exhibit "3" to R.C. deposition of 2/3/92; R.C. deposition of
2/3/92 at 18-22; Uniform Real Estate Contract, Addendum, Exhibit
"B."
7

10.

Although the Plaintiffs did not make all the payments

to the Defendants when due under the terms of the Uniform Real
Estate

Contracts,

the parties developed

process of resolving the issue.
made

after

June

of

1983,

a mutually

acceptable

In explaining how payments were

the

Plaintiff

T.

Robert

Cordner

testified as follows:
Q

Do

you

have

any

specific

recollection

of

having made payments to him on that contract after June
of 1983?
A

When Darrel came out to get the money I just

put "Roosevelt property" on my checks and I would give
him, whether the payment was in full or not I would
just check my bank account and I had certain payments
coming in and I would give him a different amount.
Q

Was this because you were delinquent and you

were not able to make the full amount of the payment in
one lump sum?
A

No.

I would

say I have this much

account, can I give you this check today?

in the

And it was

acceptable to him.
R.C. deposition of 2/3/92 at 20.
11.

During

the

period

from

May

to

July

of

1984,

the

Plaintiff Robert Cordner visited the property he was purchasing
from

the Defendants

constructed

on

the

and observed
property

that

that

he

a power
was

line had

purchasing

been
(R.C.

deposition of 2/3/92 at 23-25; R.C. deposition of 12/1/93 at 208

21 )•
12.

Without any notice to the Plaintiffs, the Defendants,

on or about April 6, 1984, executed a Right-of-Way Easement
Agrement in favor of Moon Lake Electric Association.

Under the

terms of the Easement, Moon Lake was allowed to construct power
lines and poles across the property sold to the Plaintiffs under
the terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contracts executed by the
parties.

Additionally, the Defendants represented that they

were:
. • . the owner[s] of the above-described lands
and

that

the

said

lands

are

free

and

clear of

encumbrances and liens of whatsoever character except
those held by the following persons: [none listed].
Right-of-Way Easement, Addendum, Exhibit "C".
12.

The Defendants received the sum of $13,559.00 from the

Moon Lake Electric Association for the execution of the Rightof-Way Easement, none of which was paid to the Plaintiffs or
credited to the payment of the amounts due under the Uniform Real
Estate Contracts

(Darrel Ross deposition of 4/9/92 at 16-22;

Right-of-Way Easement, Addendum, Exhibit "C").
13.

The Defendant Darrel Ross testified that he executed

the Right-of-Way

Easement

in favor of Moon Lake Electric

Association because the Plaintiffs had quit paying on the Uniform
Real Estate Contracts and apparently were not interested in going
forward with the purchase of the property with the Defendants
(D.R. deposition of 4/9/92 at 17). However, on the same date the
9

Right-of-Way

Easement

was

signed by the Defendants, April

6,

1984, the Plaintiff Robert Cordner gave the Defendant a check in
the sum of $800•00 as payment on the Contracts (D.R. deposition
of

4/9/92

at

interrogatory

26-28;
number

Defendants'
3;

answer

Exhibit

"3" to

himself,

the

Plaintiffs 1

to

R.C.

deposition

of

2/3/92).
14.

Contradicting

Defendant

Darrel

Ross

testified that he signed the Right-of-Way Easement because he had
already talked with the Plaintiff Robert Cordner about changing
the boundaries of the property

described

Estate Contracts to land not encumbered

in the Uniform
with the

Real

Right-of-Way

Easement with Moon Lake (D.R. deposition at 17).
15.

The Plaintiff, Robert Cordner testified that within a

few days after discovering the presence of the power lines on the
property he thought he was purchasing, which occurred in period
from

May

to

July,

1984,

he

discussed

the

matter

with

the

Defendant and told him:
. . . the property was no good to me [Cordner] with
an easement down through there, that's why I
purchased the other acre of property, and that I
didn't want the property, he could sell it to
somebody else and give me my money back

. . . .

R.C. deposition of 2/3/92 at 25.
In response, Ross inquired of the Plaintiff whether he would
be satisfied with the return of the principal payments to which
the

Plaintiff

responded

"•

.
10

. hell

no,

you

violated

the

contract, I want my money back."
26).

(R.C. deposition of 2/3/92 at

Ross then suggested that the boundaries of the property

sold to Cordner be changed to eliminate the easement problem:
Then I [Cordner] expressed my concern about there's
a little road between us and the motel and et.
cetera where he was going to build.
that was no problem.

And he said

I said, is there still enough

room for the motel and restaurant?

And he said

yes.
R.C. deposition of 2/3/92 at 26.
16.

The Defendant Darrel Ross acknowledges that he met with

the Plaintiff after the Right-of-Way Easement was signed, because
of the Plaintiffs concerns over the power line.

The Defendant

reports the conversation as follows:
Well, he was not completely happy about it.

I had

no control over it because they were going to put
it there.

And they said they had to have a pole

to stretch it across the highway there.

And

that's when—again, we discussed about moving the
property after the poles went in, if there was a
problem, why, we would move the property because
we could go back or we could go across the road
and put it on the other corner, or wherever we had a
lot.

We had a lot of frontage there on the

property there on the highway.
D.R. deposition of 4/9/92 at 16).
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17. The Plaintiff, Robert Cordner, testified that he had one
additional

conversation

transaction

that

conversation,

with

occurred

the

Defendant

in the Fall of

the Defendant

concerning

1984,

the

During

Darrel Ross indicated

that

that he was

going to change the boundary lines to resolve the problem (R.C.
deposition of 2/3/92 at 27).
18.

Further contradicting the Defendant's contention that

the Plaintiffs had given up their rights under the Uniform Real
Estate

Contracts

is the

fact

that

the Defendant

Darrel

Ross

testified that he advised Moon Lake Electric Association, when
the

Right-of-Way

Easement was negotiated,

that

the

Plaintiffs

were purchasing the property over which the Easement was given
(D.R. deposition at 31).
19.

On or about December 27, 1985, the Defendants conveyed

the subject property, described in the two Uniform Real Estate
Contracts executed with the Plaintiffs, by special warranty deed,
to George W. Mills and his wife (Special Warranty Deed, Addendum,
Exhibit

"D")

George

Mills was

the business

partner

of

the

Defendant (D.R. deposition at 21-23).
20. At no time have the Defendants given the Plaintiffs any
written notice claiming the Plaintiffs were in default under the
Uniform Real Estate Contracts executed by the parties or seeking
any

relief

based

upon

the

Plaintiffs'

failure

to pay

(D.R.

deposition at 43).
21.

After

the

Plaintiffs

Defendants as summarized

made

the

payments

to

the

above, the Defendant Ross charged the
12

sum of $20.50 at the Plaintiffs' business on November 24, 1986,
although Ross acknowledged that he did not have a charge account
at the Plaintiffs' business (D.R. deposition at 33-34).
22.

From November 30, 1984 to February 3, 1992, the

Plaintiff Robert Cordner visited the subject property on at
least four occasions and observed nothing which would indicate
that the property had been sold to third parties (R.C. deposition
of 2/3/92 at 32-33).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Appellants contend that the trial court committed error
in granting the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

The

Appellants contend that there are genuine issues of material fact
that precluded the granting of summary judgment and secondly,
that the Defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of
law as required by Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Appellants claim that the trial court committed error in
adjudicating

the

facts and

law regarding

the

statute of

limitations applicable to the causes of action contained in the
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.

The Appellants contend that the

trial court improperly considered and determined factual issues
relating to the statute of limitations and applied incorrect
legal principles in determining when the causes of action
contained in the Amended Complaint accrued.
Lastly,

the Appellants

contend

that

the trial

court

committed error in over-ruling the previous ruling of a district
court judge who denied the Defendants' first Motion for Summary
13

Judgment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN GRANTING THE
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE CONTRACT ISSUES
CONTAINED IN THE PLAINTIFFS1 AMENDED COMPLAINT.
A,

The Factual and Legal Background Relating to the
Plaintiffs1 Contract Claims and the Granting of Summary
Judgment.
1.

Summary of the Contract
Amended Complaint.

Issues Contained

in the

In the Amended Complaint filed by the Plaintiffs in this
case, the Plaintiffs seek an order of rescission based upon the
failure of the Defendants to provide clear and marketable title
to

the

property

described

in

the

two

Uniform

Real

Estate

Contracts (R. 167-182).
The Second Cause of Action in the Amended Complaint is one
based on breach of contract.

The Plaintiffs contend therein that

the Defendant breached the terms of the two Uniform Real Estate
Contracts by failing to provide clear and marketable title to
the property described in the Contracts (R. 167-182).
2.

The Applicable Statute of Limitations.

The parties acknowledge and agree that the relevant statute
of limitations governing actions based on a written contract is a
six

year

statute

of

limitations

as

contained

in Utah

Code

Annotated 78-12-23(2) (1994 as Amended) (R. 198-246).
3.

Summary of the Trial Court's Ruling.

In Judge Anderson's Order Granting Defendant's Motion for
Summary

Judgment

(Addendum, Exhibit

and Summary
ff

Judgment

filed on July

E"), the court ruled as follows:
14

10, 1996

. . . The underlying facts relevant to Defendants'
motion for summary judgment are undisputed.

To the

extent there is any disputed, relevant fact, the Court
views the evidence in light most favorable to the
Plaintiffs.

The relevant facts are that the Plaintiffs

and Defendants entered into two uniform real estate
contracts in June 1981 and December 1982; in breach of
those contracts, Defendants gave an easement across the
property in March or April 1984; Plaintiff Robert
Cordner was personally aware of the easement and breach
in July 1984, when he told Defendant Darrel Ross that
Ross had breached his contract with Plaintiffs.

At

that time, Mr. Cordner demanded his payments back.

At

that time, Defendant Darrel Ross offered to adjust the
boundaries to the property being sold but no agreement
was reached between the parties to do so or to return
any payments made.

After Mr. Cordner treated the

contracts as breached by Defendants, Plaintiff did not
take any legal action to enforce his rights or seek
legal redress until August 1991. As a result,
Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract, Causes I and
II of the Amended Complaint, are barred by the six-year
statute of limitation for actions on a written
contract, Utah Code Annotated 78-12-23.
R. 304-305.
4.
Summary of the Law Relating to the Granting of
Summary Judgment.
15

Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that the trial court should grant summary judgment only when the
"pleadings, depositions . . . together with affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material of fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law."
In interpreting Rule 56(c), the Utah Appellate Courts have
held

that

the

trial

court

should

view

the

facts

and

all

reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the
party opposing summary judgment.

Salt Lake Investment v. Wilford

Hansen Quarries, 302 Utah Adv. Rep. 56 (Utah 1996); Glover v. Boy
Scouts of America, supra.

Because summary judgment is a question

of law, no deference is given to the trial court's resolution of
the legal issues presented.
(1996).

Berenda v. Langford, 843 P.2d

45

Most importantly, summary judgment, by definition, does

not resolve factual issues.
892 P.2d 1047 (Utah 1995).

Healey v. J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc.,

Accordingly, a trial court cannot, in

reviewing a motion for summary judgment weigh disputed evidence.
The

sole

inquiry

is whether material

Draper City v. Bernardo, 888 P.2d

1097

issues

of

fact

(Utah 1995);

exist.

House v.

Armour of America, 886 P.2d 542 (Utah 1994).
B.

The Trial Court Committed Error, in Ruling as a Matter
of Law, that the Applicable Statute of Limitations
Commenced to Run Upon the Plaintiffs' Discovery of
Power Poles on the Property Described in the Contracts.
1.

Summary of the Facts Relating to the Defendants'
Breach.

As outlined in the Statement of Facts, the Plaintiff Robert
16

Cordner visited the property in question during the period from
May to July 1994.

At that time he observed power poles on the

property he thought was included in the Contracts executed with
the Defendants

(R.C. deposition

of 2/3/92

at 23-25; R.C.

deposition of 12/1/93 at 20-21).
After the Plaintiff observed the poles, he confronted the
Defendant Darrel Ross who offered to change the boundaries of the
property to eliminate the easement problem (R.C. deposition of
2/3/92 at 26).

j

Aside from the granting of the right-of-way easement to the
Moon Lake Electric Association, the Defendants committed one
other act in contravention to the requirements of the two Uniform
Real Estate Contracts.

On December 27, 1985, the Defendants

conveyed the property described in the two Real Estate Contracts
with the Plaintiffs, by special warranty deed, to George W.
Mills, a business partner of the Defendant Darrel Ross (D.R.
deposition of 4/9/92 at 21-23; Addendum, Exhibit "D").
Accordingly,

there were two independent

actions of the

Defendants that could be interpreted as breaches of the Uniform
Real

Estate

Defendants.

Contracts

executed

by the Plaintiffs

and the

The first, the granting of an easement by the

Defendants on April 6, 1984 which the Plaintiff discovered during
the period from May to July of 1984.

The second, the actual

conveyance of the property to a third party, the Mills, on
December 27, 1985, which the Plaintiff had no knowledge of until
shortly before the Complaint in this action was filed.
17

2.

The Granting of the Right-of-Way Easement by the
Defendants did not Start the Running of the
Statute of Limitations.

Generally,
. . . A cause of action accrues and the relevant
statute of limitations begins to run "upon the
happening of the last event necessary to complete the
cause of action" . . . .
Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84-86 (Utah 1981); Warren v. Provo
City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1128-29 (Utah 1992); Walker Drug Co,
Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 272 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 1995).
The trial court erroneously held that the granting of the
right-of-way easement and the Plaintiff's discovery thereof
commenced the running of the statute of limitations.

The court

completely ignored the established case law in Utah regarding the
time when

a vendor under uniform real estate contract is

required to provide clear title.

The basic principle is that a

"vendor in a real estate contract in generally not obliged to
have full and clear marketable title at all time during the
pendency of his contract to sell because, ordinarily, title need
not be conveyed until the final payment is made or tendered."
Leavitt v. Blohm, 357 P.2d 190-192-93 (Utah 1960); Woodward v.
Allen, 265 P.2d 398 (Utah 1953).
Paragraph 19 of the Uniform Real Estate Contracts executed
by the parties explicitly provides:
The Seller on receiving the payments herein
reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner
18

above mentioned agrees to execute and deliver to the
Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed
conveying the title to the above described premises
free and clear of all encumbrances

....

Addendum, Exhibits "A" and "B."
Additionally,

a vendor is allowed a reasonable time to

effect title and to clear any encumbrances.

Walker v. Bintz,

280 P.2d 767 (Utah 1955); Neves v. Wright, 638 P.2d 1195, 1198
(Utah 1981); Callister v. Millstream Associates, Inc., 738 P.2d
662 (Utah App. 1987).

In fact, paragraph 18 of the Uniform Real

Estate Contracts executed by the parties gives the Buyer, the
Plaintiff herein, the option of resolving

the

encumbrances

himself (Addendum, Exhibits "A" and "B").
Obviously, there are circumstances when a seller has lost or
encumbered his ownership so that he will not be able to fulfill
his contract.

Under those circumstances, a breach has occurred

and arguably, the statute of limitations commences to run on that
particular breach.

Marlowe Investment Corp. v. Radmall, 485 P.2d

1402 (1971); Treamont Investment Co. v. Home, 202 P. 547 (Utah
1921).

The basic test of whether an encumbrance incurred before

a vendor

is required

to provide title under

an executory

contract, is actionable was identified in Neves v. Wright, supra
at 1199:
The basic test in determining whether a buyer can
rescind is whether the defect, by its nature, is one
that

can

be removed,
19

as a practical

matter,

is

distinguished by defects, which, by their nature,
cannot be removed by the seller as a practical matter.
[Citing case].

A defect which, by its nature cannot be

removed by the seller as a practical matter is one "of
such a nature that the vendor neither has title nor in
a practical sense any prospect of acquiring it."
Although easements generally constitute encumbrances that
cloud title, there is an exception that is applicable to the
facts of this case.

In Hunt v. Bremer, 276 P. 964 (Idaho 1929),

the Court held that a public road right-of-way
encumbrance

is not an

of violation of a contract warranty of title

provision, as a matter of law.

The Court stated:

It is Apparent that if an encumbrance is a right
or interest which diminishes the value of the land, no
easement or other right should be regarded as an
encumbrance which essential to its enjoyment and by
which its value is enhanced.

The modern trend, now

firmly established, is that the existence of certain
public easements, or easements beneficially effecting
the land such as a public road right-of-way or canal
do not constitute encumbrances within the meaning of
covenants against encumbrances.

(Emphases added).

The test is whether the encumbrances or easement is (1)
essential to the enjoyment of the real property, and (2) enhance
the value of the real property.

Campagna v. Parker, 779 P.2d 409

(Idaho 1989).
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In order for the trial court to determine that the granting
of the right-of-way easement commenced the running of the statute
of limitations, the court had to resolve a large number of
factual issues.
maxim

that

The trial court totally disregarded the legal

the Defendants were not

obligated

to provide

marketable title until the payments were made and that an
anticipatory breach or repudiation of a contract does not create
a cause of action.

Upland Industries Corp. v. Pacific Gamble

Robinson, Co., 634 P.2d 638 (Utah 1994).
The court then, without any evidence, apparently determined
the description of the property over which the right-of-way
easement

ran and somehow platted that description over the

property described in the two Uniform Real Estate Contracts.
There was no evidence submitted to the court that the property
described in the easement with Moon Lake ran over the property
described in both Contracts executed by the parties or was simply
limited to one.

Although the Plaintiff thought the power pole

was located on property he purchased, there was no testimony
regarding the legal description and importantly, which Uniform
Real Estate Contract, the easement would have violated.
The court then apparently resolved the clearly factual issue
of whether the right-of-way easement was of "such a nature" that
the Defendants neither had the required title nor any prospect of
requiring

it.

Neves v. Wright,

supra.

No testimony was

introduced in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment that the
Defendants could not obtain a relocation of the easement to other
21

property,

if

easement.

the

Plaintiffs

were

unwilling

to

accept

the

The Defendants received over $13,000.00 for the right-

of-way and certainly could have paid to relocate a power pole so
that it did not traverse the property described in the Contract.
Further,

the

Defendants

owned

the

adjoining

piece

of

property upon which he was going to build a restaurant and motel
next to the piece of property the Plaintiffs were purchasing to
construct

a gas station R.C. deposition

of

2/3/92 at

8-10).

There is no reason to believe that the Defendants could not have
relocated the easement grant to Moon Lake to their property which
adjoined

the property

sold to the Plaintiffs.

Certainly

the

Defendants had the "reasonable prospect" of providing clear title
when the required payments were made.
There simply was no evidence from which the trial court could
have reasonably concluded that the Defendants had no prospect of
acquiring title to the property encumbered by the easement.
In addition to the fact issues surrounding the prospect of
moving

the

easement

and renegotiating

the relocation

of

the

power pole with Moon Lake Electric Association, the trial court
made absolutely no determination as to whether an easement for
the placement of power poles and electrical service constituted
an

encumbrance

warranty deed.
power

in violation

of

the

implied

covenants

of

a

The granting of an easement to provide electrical

is certainly

requirements of the

the type of easement that would meet
"rule of reason" that the encumbrance

"essential to the enjoyment of the real property" and
22

the
is

"enhance

the value of the real property."

Campagna v. Parker, supra at

413.
It is respectfully

submitted

that the trial

court's

decision regarding the easement as commencing the running of the
statute of limitations was faulty in that it ignored the clearly
established proposition that a vendor does not have an obligation
to provide clear title until payment has been made.

Secondly,

the trial court resolved clearly factual issues regarding whether
the power easement constituted

a violation of the implied

warranties and whether the Defendant had a realistic prospect of
removing the encumbrance if the court found the easement to
constitute a breach of the Contract.
3.

In the Alternative, Even if the Statute of
Limitations Expired as it Relates to the Granting
of the Easement, the Plaintiffs Timely Filed the
Action Based upon the Defendants 1 Outright
Conveyance of the Real Property.

The most critical mistake made by the trial court in
granting summary judgment on the Contract claims contained in the
Plaintiffs1 Amended Complaint is the assumption that all of the
Plaintiffs' rights terminated upon the expiration of six years
from the Defendants' first breach of the Contracts.
A simple illustration may be helpful.

As with most typical

real estate contracts, the purchaser has a number of obligations
from making

payments, paying

taxes, carrying

insurance,

maintaining the property and other explicit and implied duties.
No one would argue that if a seller failed to sue a purchaser
within six years after the purchaser had allowed the insurance to
23

lapse for a period of time, that all of the rights of the seller
were thereby extinguished under the contract.

Yet, in this case

the trial court took the position that because more than six
years

elapsed

from

the

granting

of the

easement

by

the

Defendants, all of the rights of the Plaintiffs in the Contracts
were extinguished.
Each breach of the Contracts by the Defendants created a
separate cause of action for the Plaintiffs.

Ashe v. State, 572

P.2d 1374 (Utah 1977); Tolman v. K-Mart Enterprises of Utah, 560
P.2d 1127 (Utah 1977); Leach v. Anderson, 535 P.2d 1241 (Utah
1975); O'Hair v. Kounalis, 463 P.2d 479 (Utah 1970).
court

Even if the

finds that the right to sue the Defendants over the

granting of the easement elapsed before the Complaint was filed,
that failure does not effect any other rights which subsequently
accrue from the Contracts.
In must be remembered that neither the Plaintiffs nor the
Defendants took any steps to terminate the two Uniform Real
Estate Contracts after the existence of the right-of-way easement
was discovered by the Plaintiffs.
kind

exchanged

conversations,

between

the

no one voiced

There were no writings of any
parties

and

an intent

even

in

their

to terminate

the

Contracts.
At most, the trial court should only have held that the
failure of the Plaintiffs to commence a suit in a timely fashion
based upon the execution of the easement by the Defendants
constituted a waiver of that defect.
24

John Price Associates, Inc.

v. Davis, 588 P. 2d 713 (Utah 1978).

Even if the court did find

the elements of waiver consisting of a voluntary relinquishment
of a right, the court could only find that the Plaintiffs' rights
to that specific cause of action were extinguished.
There is no case law to support the proposition that if a
bank or other vendor accepts a late payment, non-payment or a
specific breach on one occasion, without filing suit, all rights
under that contract are extinguished

after the statute of

limitations relating to the first breach has expired.
The trial court should have held that the applicable statute
of limitations related to the granting of the easement did not
expire before the Complaint was filed.

In the alternative, the

trial court committed error in holding that the failure to
commence a timely action based upon the execution of the easement
somehow extinguished all of the Plaintiffs' rights under the two
Uniform Real Estate Contracts.

Accordingly, any finding related

to the timeliness of the Plaintiffs' action based upon the
execution of the easement is not dispositive of the cause of
action based upon the conveyance of the property, the Mills.
C.

The Trial Court Committed Error, in Ruling as a Matter
of Law, that the
Statute of Limitations Applicable to
the Defendants1 Breach by Conveying the Property to a
Third Party Expired Before the Filing of the
Complaint.

As outlined above, any ruling of the trial court with regard
to the statute of limitations applicable to the Defendants'
breach in executing the easement does not control the disposition
of the issues relating to the conveyance of the property by the
25

Defendants
executing

to their business partner, Mills.
the easement

The act of

and the conveyance of the property

constitute two separate occurrences, each creating a separate
cause of action.
A cause of action accrues "upon the happening of the last
event necessary to complete the cause of action."

Walker Drug

Co. v. La Sal Oil, supra at 1231.
The undisputed facts in this case reveal that the Defendants
did not convey the subject property to their business partner
George W. Mills until December 27, 1985.

The Complaint in this

case was filed on August 21, 1991, before the expiration of the
six

year

period

contained

in the

applicable

statute

of

limitations, Utah Code Annotated 78-12-23(2) (1994 as Amended).
Further, the Plaintiff Robert Cordner testified that he did not
know that the Defendants had conveyed the property and in fact
from November 30, 1984 to February 3, 1992, visited the subject
property on at least

four different occasions and observed

nothing which would indicate the subject property had been sold
or transferred (R.C. deposition of 2/3/92 at 32-33).
It is interesting to note that Judge Payne in his decision
initially denying the Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment
found that the Plaintiffs did not discover the sale to Mr. Mills
by the Defendants until 1990 (R. 85-88).

Using either the actual

date the conveyance to Mills was made or the date it was
discovered by the Plaintiffs, the action was timely filed under
the statute of limitations of six years applicable to written
26

contracts.
Utah case law establishes that the discovery rule may
operate to toll the period of limitations "until the discovery of
facts forming the basis for the cause of action."

Warren v.

Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992); Myers v. McDonald,
supra at 84.

The Utah Appellate Courts have recognized that the

discovery rule applies,
. . . In situations where a plaintiff does not
become aware of the cause of action because of the
defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and
. . . In situations where the case presents exceptional
circumstances and the application of the general rule
would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any
showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery
of the cause of action.
Warren, supra at 1149.
In this case, there is no question that there is a factual
issue relating to the Defendants' conduct.

The Defendants

conveyed the property which was the subject of the Contracts with
the Plaintiffs to their business partner.

The Defendants never

took any steps to terminate the Contracts with the Plaintiffs or
to advise the Plaintiffs that they intended to convey the
property.

Instead, the Defendants kept all of the money paid by

the Plaintiffs and, without more, conveyed the property to their
partner.

The evidence certainly supports Judge Payne's finding

that the Plaintiff did not discover the sale to Mills until 1990
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and pursuant to the discovery rule, the statute had only run for
approximately one year before the Complaint was filed.
Obviously,

if the

application

of the

discovery

rule

is

needed in this case based upon the contract theories alleged in
the Amended
related

Complaint, there

to the Defendants

are a myriad

concealment

of

factual

issues

that would have to be

resolved by the finder of fact.
It is respectfully

submitted

that the Causes of Action,

Count I and II of the Amended Complaint based upon the conveyance
of

the

property

to Mr. Mills

were

timely

filed

before

the

expiration of the statute of limitations.
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN GRANTING THE
DEFENDANTSy MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE FRAUD ISSUES
CONTAINED IN THE PLAINTIFFS1 AMENDED COMPLAINT.
A.

The Factual and Legal Background Relating to the
Plaintiffs1 Fraud Claims and the Granting of Summary
Judgment.
1.

The

Summary of the Fraud
Amended Complaint.

Third

Cause

of

Action

of

Issues
the

Contained

Plaintiffs 1

in

the

Amended

Complaint seeks a determination that the Defendants, both of whom
executed

the

right-of-way

easement

agreement

with Moon

Lake

Electric Association and the deed conveying the property to Mills
engaged in fraudulent conduct justifying the award of general,
special and punitive damages.
2.

The Applicable Statute of Limitations.

The parties acknowledge and agree that the relevant statute
of

limitations governing

actions based on fraud

is Utah

Annotated 78-12-26(3) (1994 as Amended) which provides:
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Code

Within three years:
(3) An action for relief upon the grounds of fraud
or mistake; except that the cause of action in such
case does not accrue until the discovery by the
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud
or mistake.

(Emphasis added).

Id; R. 198-246.
3.

Summary of the Trial Court's Ruling.

In Judge Anderson's Order Granting Summary Judgment, the
court ruled as follows:
Plaintiffs also claim that they were defrauded or
lulled into inaction by the offer of Defendant Darrel
Ross in July 1984 to change the boundaries and to get
back to Plaintiffs regarding that offer.

The parties

were then on an equal footing and neither had any
advantage over the other.

There was neither any

agreement between the parties to return any payments
nor promise by Defendant Ross to change the
boundaries.

There is no evidence that the Defendants

concealed any claim or fact from the Plaintiff or made
any false representation that rises to the level of
fraud.

To the extent Plaintiffs claim the statute of

limitations is tolled because they were lulled into
inaction on their claims by the promise of, "I'll get
back to you," the Court determines that any reliance
thereon for over seven years was unreasonable and does
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not excuse Plaintiffs' failure to act within the period
of the status of limitations.

Plaintiffs' failure to

institute a legal action for over seven years was not
reasonable

or

excusable

neglect,

based

upon

the

undisputed facts in this case.
4.

Summary of the Law Relating to the Granting
Summary Judgment.

of

Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that the trial court should grant summary judgment only when the
"pleadings, depositions . . . together with affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material of fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law."
In interpreting Rule 56(c), the Utah Appellate Courts have
held

that

the

trial

court

should

view

the

facts

and

all

reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the
party opposing summary judgment.

Salt Lake Investment v. Wilford

Hansen Quarries, 302 Utah Adv. Rep. 56 (Utah 1996); Glover v. Boy
Scouts of America, supra.

Because summary judgment is a question

of law, to deference is given to the trial court's resolution of
the legal issues presented.
(1996).

Berenda v. Langford, 843 P.2d

45

Most importantly, summary judgment, by definition, does

not resolve factual issues.
892 P.2d 1047 (Utah 1995).

Healey v. J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc.,

Accordingly, a trial court cannot, in

reviewing a motion for summary judgment weigh disputed evidence.
The

sole

inquiry

is whether

material

Draper City v. Bernardo, 888 P.2d
30
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issues

of

fact

(Utah 1995);

exist.

House v.

Armour of America, 886 P.2d 542 (Utah 1994).
B.

The Trial Court Committed Error, in Ruling as a Matter
of Law, that the Statute of Limitations Applicable to
Fraud Actions
Expired Before the Filing of the
Plaintiffsf Complaint.
1.

Summary of the Facts Relating to the Defendants'
Fraud.

The facts in this case reveal that the Defendants did not
inform the Plaintiffs of the circumstances relating to the
execution of the easement with Moon Lake.

When the Plaintiff

Robert Cordner confronted the Defendant, the Defendant told the
Plaintiff that he would take the steps necessary to change the
boundaries of the property to eliminate the problem.

In a

subsequent conversation in the Fall of 1984, the Defendant Darrel
Ross again told the Plaintiff that he was going to change the
boundary lines to resolve the easement problem (R.C. deposition
2/3/92 at 27).
The Defendants never took any steps to terminate the
Plaintiffs' interest in the Contracts.

The Defendants did not

refund to the Plaintiffs any of the purchase price, did not
initiate default procedures under the Contract or take any other
action.

The Defendants were careful not to provide

the

Plaintiffs with notice that on December 27, 1985, the Defendants
together conveyed the subject property to their business partner,
George W. Mills.

Until 1992, the Plaintiff visited the property

and could observe nothing that would indicate that the property
had been sold.
2.

The Cause of Action Based on Fraud was Brought
Within the Applicable Statute of Limitations.
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As

noted

in Myers,

supra

at

84-86,

a cause

of

action

accrues and the relevant statute of limitations begins to run
"upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the
cause of action."
The

landmark

case

in Utah

relating

to

the

elements

of

fraudulent misrepresentation is Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141,
144-45, 247 P.2d 273, 274-75 (1952).

As outlined in Pace, supra

the essential elements in a fraudulent misrepresentation action
are:
1.

[t]hat a representation was made;

2.

concerning a presently existing material of fact;

3.

which was false;

4.

which the representor either
(a) knew to be false; or
(b)

made

recklessly,

knowing

that

he

had

insufficient knowledge upon which to base such
representation;
5.

for the purpose of inducing the other party to act

upon it;
6.

that the other party, acting reasonably and in

ignorance of its falsity;
7.

did in fact rely upon it;

8.

and was thereby induced to act;

9.

to his injury and damage.

The Utah Supreme Court has stated that

"as to a cause of

action based on fraud, the statute of limitations does not begin
32

to run until the fraud is discovered."

Leach v. Anderson, 535

P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 1975).
A superficial review of the Statement of Facts reveals that
the

Defendants

existing

fact.

made

a representation

The Defendant

concerning

told the Plaintiff

a

presently

that he was

going to change the boundary line and subsequently that he was
working on it.

The Defendant told the Plaintiff in 1984 that he

was going to change the boundary line.

The statement that the

Defendant had in fact proceeded with activity to change the
boundaries of the property
of presently existing fact.

constituted a mis-statement
Utah law establishes that if a

person makes a promise and did not intend to perform the future
promise

when

they

made

them,

the

misrepresentations

are

actionable.

Berkeley Bank Coops, v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 805

(Utah 1980).

As noted by the Court:

A closely similar problem is raised by a promise
or statement of future conduct by one who, at the
time, intends not to fulfill the promise.

The

promise itself is regarded as a representation of
a present intention to perform.

Hence, such a

promise, made by one not intending to perform
operates as a misrepresentation-a misrepresentation
of the speaker's state of mind, at the time, and
is actionable as a misrepresentation of "fact."
To profess an intent to do or not to do, when
a party intends the contrary, is as clear as
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a misrepresentation and fraud as could be made.
Accordingly,

the

misrepresentation

Defendant's
of

statements

a presently

existing

constituted
fact

which

a
the

Defendant knew or should have known was false.
There is no question that the Defendant knew or should have
known that the statement relating to changes in the boundary line
was false.

Certainly it is clear that the Defendants' purpose in

making the statement was to induce the Plaintiffs into a course
of inaction.
Having

determined

that

the

initial

misrepresentation

regarding the boundary line occurred in 1984, that the conveyance
of the property to the third party occurred in December of 1985
and that the Plaintiff visited the property regularly but did not
learn of the conveyance to Mills until 1990, the question then
becomes when the Plaintiff should have reasonably discovered all
of the elements relevant to a cause of action based upon fraud.
Utah recognizes the discovery rule which operates to toll
the

period

of

limitations

until

the

discovery

forming the basis for the cause of action.

of

the

facts

Walker Drug Co. v. La

Sal, supra.
As previously discussed, the discovery rule applies when,
(1) in situations where
mandated

by

statute;

plaintiff

does not

(2)

become

the
in

discovery

situations

aware of

the

rule

is

where

a

defendant's

concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) exceptional
circumstances and the application of the general rule
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would

be irrational or unjust, regardless of any

showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery
of the cause of action.
Id. at 1129.
In this case, the discovery rule should be employed because
the statute mandates it, because of the Defendants' concealment
and because

of the circumstances

Defendants obtained

a significant

of this case where

the

amount of money from the

Plaintiffs and then surreptitiously encumbered the property and
then sold it to third parties.
Accordingly, the three year statute of limitations for
fraud "begins to run from the time the person entitled to the
property knows, or by reasonable diligence or inquiry should
know, the relevant facts of fraud."
at 6.

Berenda v. Langford, supra

In cases where the defendant took steps to conceal the

plaintiff's cause of action, "the plaintiff can avoid the full
operation of the discovery rule by making a prima facie showing
of fraudulent concealment and then demonstrating that given the
defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have
discovered the claim earlier.

Id.

See Warren v. Provo City

Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Utah 1992) (balancing reasonableness
of plaintiff's diligence in discovering claim against defendant's
acts of concealment); Chapman v. Primary Children's Hospital, 784
P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989) (same); Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 538
P.2d 105, 107 (Utah 1978) (finding that reasonable reliance on
defendant's misrepresentations tolled statute of limitations
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until discovery of cause of action).
Chief Justice Zimmermann in Berenda explicitly held that:
The

application

of

this

legal

rule

(discovery

rule) to any particular set of facts is necessarily a
matter left to the trial courts and finders of fact
•

In

so holding,

we explicitly

acknowledge

that

weighing the reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct
in light of the defendant's steps to conceal a cause of
action necessitates the type of actual findings which
precludes summary judgment in all but the clearest of
cases.
the

Thus, summary judgment is appropriate only when

facts

continuum:
reasonable

fall

on

two

opposite

ends

of

a

factual

either (i) when the facts are so clear that
persons

could

not

disagree

about

the

underlying facts about the application of the governing
legal

standard

to the facts or

(ii) when the

facts

underlying the allegation of fraudulent concealment or
so tenuous, vague or insufficiently

established

that

they fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact as
to concealment, with the result that the claim fails as
a matter of law.

(Emphasis added).

There have been a number of other Utah cases relating to
summary

judgment

motions

involving

allegations

misrepresentation.

In Condor v. A.L. Williams

Inc. , 739

(Utah Ct. App.

P.2d

634

1977),

of

fraudulent

& Associates,

the Utah

Appeals reversed the trial court's granting of partial
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Court

of

summary

judgment

in

a

misrepresentation.

case

involving

a

claim

of

fraudulent

The Court noted that "reasonable reliance

must be considered with reference to the facts of each case, and
is usually a question for the jury to determine."

Id. at 638.

See also, Berkeley Bank Coops, v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798 (Utah
1980).

Further, Utah law establishes that generally a plaintiff

may justifiably rely on positive assertions of fact without
independent investigation.

See Neuman v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239,

1247 (Utah 1980).
Utah law recognizes negligent misrepresentation.
Brunswick Corp., 423 P.2d

659, 662 (Utah 1967).

Jardine v.
Negligent

misrepresentation exists when one having a pecuniary interest in
a transaction is in a superior position to know material facts
and carelessly or negligently makes a false

representation

concerning them expecting the other party to act and rely thereon
and the other party reasonably does so and suffers loss in the
transaction.

Certainly the Defendants' conduct constitutes

negligent misrepresentation.
The Court in Larson v. Overland Thrift and Loan, 171 Utah
Adv. Rep. 60 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), overturned the trial court's
granting

of

summary

judgment

relating

to

fraudulent

misrepresentation finding that the allegations claimed in the
complaint supported a claim of fraud.
The Plaintiffs have clearly established a prime facie case
of fraud and negligent misrepresentation.

The Plaintiffs did not

discover the misrepresentation until he learned of the transfer
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of the property in 1990.

The filing of the lawsuit in August of

1991 was clearly within the statute of limitations.
Judge Anderson's decision in this case that the Plaintiffs'
reliance on the Defendants' statements for a period of seven
years was unreasonable as a matter of law is not justified.

The

Defendant in addition to conveying the property to his partner
Mills in 1985, failed to take any affirmative action to terminate
the contracts with the Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs continued to
visit the property.
the

Based upon the absence of any improvement on

land or physical

signs showing the property had been

conveyed, the Plaintiffs had no reason to believe that their
rights under the Contract had been extinguished, there certainly
is a factual

issue relating

Plaintiffs' reliance.

to the reasonableness

of the

The Plaintiff reasonably believed that the

Defendant was working on the change in the boundaries.

Further,

the Plaintiff was purchasing the property to build a truck stop
next to the restaurant and motel that Mr. Ross was going to
construct on his adjoining property.
started

Because Mr. Ross had not

the construction of the motel

and restaurant,

the

Plaintiffs were not in a hurry to finish the purchase of the
property.

Under the circumstances, the reliance was certainly

reasonable.
It is respectfully submitted that Judge Anderson's Order
granting summary judgment on the fraud claims constitutes error
and that the Plaintiffs are entitled to a factual determination
relating to the elements of fraud plead in the Amended Complaint.
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Under the circumstances, it was not unusual for the Plaintiff to
wait a period of years to finalize the payment.

Clearly the

Plaintiffs and the Defendants were waiting for the economics in
the Eastern Utah area to change to start the construction of the
planned improvements.

As long as the Defendants were taking no

action

stricter

to

insist

on

contracts, the Plaintiffs
executed

by the parties

payments

reasonably

or

to

terminate

relied on the

the

contracts

and the failure of the Defendant

to

inform them regarding any breach or termination.
POINT III: JUDGE ANDERSON ERRED IN OVERRULING THE
DENIAL OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY JUDGE PAYNE.
The Defendants

first

submitted

Judgment on May 19, 1992 (R. 36-62).

their Motion

for Summary

In a three page decision,

Judge Payne denied the motion outlining explicitly the factual
issues that needed to be resolved by a finder of fact.

A copy of

Judge Payne's decision is attached as Exhibit "F" to the Addenda.
By granting summary judgment, on essentially the same motion
made

before

Judge

Payne,

Judge

Anderson

violated

a

long

recognized principle that once a judge has made a determination
of a motion, that determination becomes the "law of the case."
That doctrine embodies the principle that a court should
reconsider

or overrule

a decision made by

a co-equal court.

Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Inc., 692 P.2d
(Utah 1984).

not

735, 736

As Justice Zimmermann in that case stated:

One branch of what is generally termed the doctrine
of "law of the case" has evolved to avoid the delays
and difficulties that arise when one judge is
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presented with an issue identical to one which has
already been passed upon by a coordinate judge in the
same case.

"[0]rdinarily one judge of the same court

cannot properly overrule the decision of another judge
of that court."

Richardson v. Grant Central Corp.,

572 P.2d at 397.
See also, State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993);
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398-99 (Utah 1994).
POINT IV:

THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DISMISSING THE CLAIMS
OF THE DEFENDANT CLELLA ROSS.

Judge Anderson, in his decision ruled, as a matter of law
that both the contract and fraud causes of action against the
Defendant Clella Ross should be dismissed.
The Plaintiffs

submit that there are ample questions

relating to Mrs. Ross.
Contrary to the assertions of the Defendants, there is
ample evidence to support the proposition that Mrs. Ross knew or
should have known of the misconduct.

Mrs. Ross was a signatory

to both Uniform Real Estate Contracts.

Additionally, Mrs. Ross

after agreeing to convey the property in an unencumbered state to
the Cordners, signed the Right-of-Way Easement in favor of Moon
Lake Electric Association.
It was the Defendants who prepared the Uniform Real Estate
Contracts signed by the parties.

In paragraph 11 of the Uniform

Real Estate Contract, Mrs. Ross warranted that there were not any
assessments or encumbrances on the property.

The Defendants knew

that no easement was listed as an encumbrance within the terms of
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the Uniform Real Estate Contract.

Accordingly, Mrs. Ross knew

that in contravention of the Contract with the Cordners, she was
encumbering

the property

and receiving

substantial

monies

therefore.
In addition, Mrs. Ross was a party to the transfer of the
land that had been sold to the Plaintiffs to George Mills and his
wife.

That act constitutes the culmination of the fraudulent

activity in the case.

Certainly there is enough to establish a

prima facie case of her involvement in the improper behavior.
CONCLUSION
The trial court committed error in granting summary judgment
in this case and in doing so misapplied the law and, in violation
of Rule 56, resolved the factual issues.

The Plaintiffs' Causes

of Action based on contract and fraud were brought within the
applicable statute of limitations.

Accordingly,

the trial

court's order granting summary judgment should be reversed.
Additionally,

Judge Anderson's granting of Defendants'

motion for summary judgment improperly reconsidered the earlier
decision of Judge Payne in contravention of the "law of the
case" doctrine.
Finally, the Plaintiff has established a prima facia case
against Clella Ross, who was a signatory to all of the critical
documents executed by the parties in this case.
DATED this

*~

day of December,
Michael J. Petro, Esq.
Attorney for Appellants
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that two copies each of the Appellants' Brief were
mailed, postage prepaid, to Mr. Arthur H. Nielsen, Esq., of
NIELSEN & SENIOR, Eagle Gate Tower, 60 East South Temple, Salt
Lake

City, Utah,

84111,

and Mr. Clark R. Nielsen, HENROID

&

NIELSEN, 60 East South Temple #1100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
on this

day of December, 1996.
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Exhibit A:

Uniform Real Estate Contract dated 6/10/81.

UNlhORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this

by and between

jQ

day of

£

U n

?

, A. D., 19iL<L

Barrel L. Ross and C l e l l a C. Ross

hereinafter designated as the Seller, and .

T. Robert Cordner and Gloria Cordner
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of

«r

TwQ acres In the Mall Area Of TheAlrport Ind. Park.

2. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer,
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate in
the county of _

Duchesne

, state of Utah, to-wit:

R o o s e v e l t , Utah
ADDRESS

More particularly described as follows:

D e s c r i p t i o n Attached As Schedule A,
Description Attached As Schedule B
Option To purchase One year From
S£e Date of this Agreement and Contract.The Price tobe $20,000.00
•JJSgjpthe one Acre Described.If not Purchased one year from now The
imyir will have the First Right or Rufusal to Purchase, But the
Price to be Negotiated By Both Parties.

3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of .

$^0.000.00

Forty Thousand and no/Ion

payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order

Dollars ($40,000.00 >

3 0 2 1 Comanche

L n . PrOVO U t .

strictly within the following times, to-wit:
TWO T h O U S a n d & N o / l O Q
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $ - 3 " , 0 0 0 . 0 0

84601

($ 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 — )
shall be paid as follows:

$8,000.00 To be paid Sep. 1 1981
Annual Payments o f $ 6 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 P l u s I n t r e s t due Annually For 5 Years
On^the 10 th. Day of June 1982. First Paymentof $6,000.00 willBe

Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the _

_ day of

4. Said monthly payments are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the
principal. Interest shall be charged from

June

1 0 t h 19&1

on a

^ unpaid portions of the

purchase price a t the rate of
XW.6lY.e
per cent ( _ _ j L 2
% ) per annum. The Buyer, at his option at anytime,
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made a t the time the excess payment is made.
5. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller.
6. I t jJ s understood that, there _presejitly
ari obligation
oblij
jpresejitly eod^ts.
eodsts.aji
agaii

First Security Bank (Entire Tract;
2^,000.00
June 1981
as of

. with an unpaid balance of

7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said premises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said property, except the following
*V ,&
.
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest a t the rate of not to exceed

percent

( 1 ^ <•/.) per annum and payable in regular monthly installments; provided that the agrregate monthly installment
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shal} not be greater than each installment payment required to be
made by the Buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property
subject to said loans and mortgages.
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obligations outstanding at date of this agreement against said ptoperty, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect
to obligations against said property incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid bv ,*ller «rJ?e«»
said obligations are assumed or approved by buyer.
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the expenses necessary in obtaining said loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-half, provided however, that the -monthly payments and
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above.
11. The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following:

o uiiCxWibMt

iyOX"

13. The Buyer further agrees to keep all insurable buildings and improvements on said premises insured in a company acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract, or $—
and to assign said insurance to the Seller as his interests may appear and to deliver the insurance policy^
,14. In the event the Buyer shall default in the payment of any special or general taxes, assessments or insurance
premiums as herein provided, the Seller may, at his option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either
of them, and if Seller elects so to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums so advanced
and paid by him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of % of one percent per
month until paid.
15. Buyer agrees that ho will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon
said premises, and that he will maintain said premises in good condition.
10. In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make
—any payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within
*1Q
days t.hGre?fter, the
Seller, at his option shall have the following alternative remedies:
"~ ~-'~~ ~~ — • A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer to remedy the default within five days after written notice,
to be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, and all payments which have
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter and take
possession of said premises without legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with all improvements and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with
the land become the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default): or
C. The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contiact as a note and mortgage, and pass
title to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of
the State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing,
including costs and attorney's fees; and the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency which may remain.
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant
to order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession
of the said premises during the period of redemption.
17. It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement.
18. In the event there are any liens or encumbrances against said premises other than those herein provided for or
referred to, or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the
same by acts or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the payments herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such time as such suspended
payments shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid.
19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the
above desciibed premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued
by or through the acts or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at any time during the
term of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer.
20. It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property
in its present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto with
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto

21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained herein, that the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any
remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit
or otherwise.
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, sue- .
cessors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement have hereunto signed their names, the day and year
first above written.
s
Signed in the presence of

Buyer
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Exhibit B:

Uniform Real Estate Contract dated 12/27/82.

m
"THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT. IF NOT UNDERSTOOD. SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE."

UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this
by and between

Parrel

1

2

? -"k*1*

D E C

day of

ROSS & C l e l l a

C.

*

, A. D., 1 9 . J ^ L ,

ROSS

hereinafter designated as the Seller, and .

T. Robert Cordner & Gloria Cordner
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of

Onfi

Ar.rfi

Airport I n d u s t r i a l Park

in

ThP

Mall

ArPR

Of

Thft

j ;

.

!

2. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer, j ;
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate in ; ;
the county of
Duchesne
, state of Utah, to-wit:
Roosevelt. Utah.
;\
ADDRESS

j,

More particularly described as follows:

Description Attached as Schedule B.

W\

3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of .

$20.000.00

Twenty thousand and nn/1 00

payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order
|:i|| strictly within the following times, to-wit:

n

3021

Comanche

$5,000-00

& no/100

Dollars <$_
Ln.

PrOVO,

Utah,
(f

cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $ 1 5 t OOP . 0 0

8^601

5,000.00

» ,;

shall be paid as follows:

$3,000.00 to be paid January 31, , 1984 Plus 12J& Intrest.
Annual Payments of $3,000,00 Per Year on January 31st. Of each Year.
Untill the Ballance of $15,000.00 Is Paid off In Full.
This will be a Five year contract after the
$5,000.00 Down Payment .At $3,000.00 Per Year Plus 12fo Intrest On
all unpayed Ballance.
Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the V ^ - S T
jjij!

day of

January

j.;

;;;;

^ 19_J___L.

;:!

4. Said monthly payments are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the

principal. Interest shall be charged from
J a n u a r y 3^ s t •
on all unpaid portions of the jjj
purchase price at the rate of T w e l v e
Jud
^ p e r a n n u m ^he Buyer, at his option at anytime, | >!
per cent (
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage ;'!'<
i!'|| or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future i
jj' installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made.
| :|
5. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according j-jii
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will m no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture j >''
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller.
j-jj:
6. It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of

!.'!"

. with an unpaid balance of
_, as of „
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said premises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said property, except the following
________________»___,
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and. maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the
thep.unpaid

contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed

percent

(
%) per annum and payable in regular monthly installments; provided that the a g r e g a t e monthly installment
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be
made by the Buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to tne amount of any such
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property
subject to said loans and mortgages.
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under *
gations outstanding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be tb
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of. said prior oblip
to obligations against said property incurred by seller, after dat« of this
said obligations are assumed or approveq* by buyer.
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Sellamount as can be secured under the regulations of said '
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the

#:<
12. The Buyer agrees to pay the general taxes after .
13. The Buyer further agrees to keep all insurable buildings and improvements on said premises insured in a company acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract, or $«
and to assign said insurance to the Seller as his interests may appear and to deliver the insurance policy to him.
i
14. In the event the Buyer shall default in the payment of any special or general taxes, assessments or insurance
premiums as herein provided, the Seller may, at his option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either
of them, and if Seller elects so to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums so advanced
and paid by him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of % of one percent per
month until paid.
15. Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon
said premises, and that he will maintain said premises in good condition.
16. In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make
any payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within
days thereafter, the
Seller, at his option shall have the following alternative remedies:
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer to remedy the default within five days after written notice,
to be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, and all payments which have
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter and take
possession of said premises without legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with all improvements and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with
the land become the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default): or
Hill
C. The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contract as a note and mortgage, and pass
title to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of
the State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing,
including costs and attorney's fees; and the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency which may remain.
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant
to order of the court: and trie Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession
of the said premises during the period of redemption.
17. It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement.
18. In the event there are any liens or encumbrances against said premises other than those herein provided for or
referred to, or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the
same by acts or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the payments herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such time as such suspended
payments shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid.
19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the
above described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued
by or through the acts or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at any time during the
term of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer.
20. It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property
in its present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto with
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto _ _ .
21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained herein, that the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including, a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any
remedy provided hereunder or l>y the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit
or otherwise.
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement;
hereunto signed their names, the day and year
first above written.
Signed in the presence of
I: !'

Fil

7--V.
^WU^?
Buyer
>•
2

*

Z

o
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Exhibit C:

Right of Easement and Check.

RIGHT-OF-WAY EASEMENT
I, We,
P a r r e l L. Ross and C l e l l a C. Ross
the undersigned, for good and valuable consideration ».<.., receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do hereby
grant unto MOON LAKE ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION INCor.^CHATED, (hereinafter Called the "Cooperative")
whose post office address is P.O. Box ?7H. i v.»osavelt. Utah 8406b, . - ^ to its successors or assigns, the exclusive~"""r~t of-wav P-—
-\ V:.* '•• _..- _lcet wide from the center line as ».^c?fter described, and for said purp: \
jnuei&.yncu also giant to Cooperative the right to reasonable ingress and e ^ . ^ c upon the adjacent lands of '.
undersigned. Said right-of-way is situated in the County of
Duchesne
Utah
tr.*-icni
and is more particularly described as follows:
A right of way in the Roosevelt Municipal Airport Subdivision, Roosevelt City
Survey. The right of way 1556.3 feet in length is bounded on the East by the East
lot lines of lots 109, 106, and 97 of the Roosevelt Municipal Airport Subdivision.
The V/est boundary is a line measured at right angles to and lying 50 feet to the
V/est of the following described center line. Beginning at a point S 88* 04' 10" E
1163.16 feet from the West one quarter corner of Section 29, Township 2 South,
Range 1 West, U.S.M.: Thence, S 43° 26' 03" W 64.51 feet. Here a radius of 70
feet^on the turn for anchoring: Thence S 0' 35* 57" E 1491.79 feet, to a point
S 35* 51* 06" E 1946.67 feet from the West one quarter corner said Section 29.
NTRY N c £ ? 7 & 5 J L _ OATH $/..-.At.-fy. TiM£ f-LC&Jkto^ * C O * fixJJ^- PAG£ J / A —
EE$ _*3fJ3L
accorrro AT R E C ^ T or- ^pT^t^^
c&Ubc<.-..J~&^
<l%**yLc>„'lJli
'.'.,..:.-ir. ».K".--n;-.fa
OfrUTI
and to construct, reconstruct, rephase. repair, operate and maintain on the above described lands and/or in or upon
all streets, roads or highways, abutting said lands, an electric transmission and/or distribution line or system; to cut,
trim, remove, and/or control the growth, by chemical means, machinery or otherwise, of trees and shrubbery located
within —50— feet of the center line of said line or system, or that may reasonably interfere with or threaten to endanger
the operation and maintenance of said line or system.
The undersigned agrees that all poles, wires and other facilities, including any main service entrance equipment,
installed on the above-described lands at the Cooperative's expense shall remain the property of the Cooperative,
removable at the option of the Cooperative, upon termination of service to or on said lands.
The undersigned convenants that he/she/they is/are the owner of the above-described lands and that the said lands
are free and clear of encumbrances and liens of whatsoever character except those held by the following persons:
Name

Address

(Insert Name and Address of Lien Holder, or if no liens, the word "NONE")
It is further understood that, whenever necessary, words used in this instrument in the singular shall be construed to
read in the plural and that words used in the masculine gender shall be construed to read in the feminine.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has set his/her/their hand and seal^us^
19
.
GRANTORS
Signed, sealed and delivered in the presence of:

day of

/<£&
fllL'^/ft^;

WITNESSES:

STATE OF U f c h

County „< utflK

On the i £ _ d a y of
&T\(A

CI^JlCl

\

PjPPl '
P,.

j
19^7

ss.

, personally appeared before me fhiyVVJ

r\OS^\

L- /TOTS

, the signer(s) of the abovve\nstrumeYil. who duly

acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the same.

c

:*

Notary/Public
My Commission Expires:
f)[}a
10 J gib

Residing at:

)0/>*\t>\
'J'QWJ,.

''/l/T^
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DEPOSITION
EXHIBIT
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DEPOSITED WITH

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK
UNIVERSITY OFFICE
P.O. Box 69
Provo, Utah
84603
TO THE CREDIT OF

DARREL L. ROSS OR CLELLA C. ROSS
BUSINESS ACCOUNT
3021 COMANCHE LANE
801-375-3404)
PROVO, UTAH
84601
ALL I T E M S ARE R E C E I V E D BY T H I S SANK FOR P U R P O S E S OF COLLECTION
A N D ARE S U B J E C T TO T H E U N I F O R M C O M M E R C I A L CODE.
ALL C R E D I T S FOR I T E M S A R E P R O V I S I O N A L U N T I L COLLECTED.
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Exhibit D:

Special Warranty Deed from Ross to Mills.
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EXHIBIT "C"
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED

DARREL L. ROSS, <nd CLELLA C. ROSS, husband and wife, of
3021 Commanche I »ne, Provo, Utah County, State of Utah,
Grantor, hereby !ONVEY and WARRANT to
GEORGE W. MILLS m d DIANA F. MILLS, husband and wife, of
10681 North 537( West, Highland, Utah County, State of Utah,
Grantees, as joi «t tenants,
for TEN DOLLARS tnd other good and valuable consideration,
certain real pr< »erty situated in Duchesne County, State of
Utah, and more \ irticularly described on Exhibit "A"
attached hereto.
WITNESS the han< \ of said Grantors this
December, 1985.

£{

$

day of

'7
)ARREL L. ROSS, Grantor

"V.

•J

V^P^
:LELLA C. ROSS, Grantor
CL
STATE OF UTAH ) SS.
County of Utah )
On the £'/ day of December, 1985, DARREL L. RO$S and
CLELLA C. ROSS appeared personally before me and acknowledged to me that they did execute the foregoing for./the"
purposes therein stated.
\ * .t] »
P ''•'

N6tfary P u b l i c
My c oDmmission
mmission

expires:

Residing at

"~'
^fateX^frJL^ Utah
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EXHIBIT "A"
The following described real property situated in Duchesne
County, State of Utah:
Lots 85 through 88, 94 through 97, and 101 through 106, and 10&
MUNICIPAL AIRPORT INDUSTRIAL PARK SUBDIVISION, a subdivision
of Section 29, T. 2 S., R. 1 W., Unitah Special Meridian, as
annexed to the City of Roosevelt, and according to the
official plat thereof in the office of the Recorder of
Duchesne County, State of Utah.
TOGETHER with all appurtances thereunto belonging.
SUBJECT to all existing easements and rights-of-way.
EXCEPTING THEREFROM all oil, gas, and mineral rights.
Together with the following additional parcels, also
situated in Duchesne County, State of Utah:
Commencing at the Southwest Corner of Section 29, Township 2
South, Range 1 West of the Uintah Special Base and Meridian;
Thence East 139.39 feet; Thence North 384.27 feet to the
North right-of-way line of U.S. Highway 40; Thence North
55* 55* 20" East 1250.98 feet along said right-of-way line
to the Southeast Corner of the MUNICIPAL AIRPORT INDUSTRIAL
PARK SUBDIVISION, said point being the TRUE POINT OF
BEGINNING: Thence South 65* 65' 20M West 184.98 feet along said North
right-of-way line to the East right-of-way line of a City
Street; Thence North 34* 04' 40" West 304.11 feet along
said right-of-way; Thence North 55* 55' 20" East 387.97
feet to the East line of said SUBDIVISION;
Thence South 0* 21* 20" East 365.63 feet along said East
line to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING, containing 2.00 acres.
Commencing at the Southwest Corner of Section 29, Township 2
South, Range 1 West of the Uintah Special Base and Meridian;
Thence East 139.39 feet; Thence North 384.27 feet to the
North right-of-way line of U.S. Highway 40; Thence North
55* 55* 20" East 1250.98 feet along said right-of-way to the
Southeast Corner of the MUNICIPAL AIRPORT INDUSTRIAL PARK
SUBDIVISION; thence North 0* 21• 20" West 365.63 feet along
the East line of said SUBDIVISION to the TRUE POINT OF
BEGINNING:
Thence South 55# 55' 20" West 387.97 feet to the East rightof-way of a City Street;
Thence North 34* 04' 40" West 103.13 feet along said rightof-way line;
Thence North 55* 55* 20" East 456.80 to said East
SUBDIVISION line;
Thence South 0# 21' 20" East 123.99 feet to the TRUE POINT
OF BEGINNING, containing 1.00 acres.

Exhibit E: Judge Payne's Decision and Order
Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
in and for Duchesne County
of the State of Utah
CIVIL MINUTE ENTRY
T. ROBERT CORDNER & GLORIA CORDNER

NO. 91-CV-125-D
DATE: SEPTEMBER 14, 19S2

VS.
DARREL L. ROSS 6c CLELLA C. ROSS

JUDGE:

A. LYNN PAYNE

D E C I S I O N
The matter comes before the undersigned pursuant to the defendants
motion for Summary Judgment dated May 14, 1992,
The court having
reviewed the memorandum and affidavit now rules as follows:
1. The Plaintiffs as "purchasers" and the defendants as "sellers"
entered into uniform real estate contracts dated June 10, 1981
and December 27, 1982. On or about April 6, 1984 the sellers
granted Moon Lake Electric a utility easement across the property
which they had previously agreed to convey to the sellers. By the
end of July of 1984 purchasers became aware of the encumbrances
when they observed large electrical lines upon the property.
Thereafter, the parties discussed the existence of the power
2.
line s upon the property. The parties apparently disagree as to the
natu re of the discussion between the parties . For the purpose of
thei r motion, sellers take the position that purchasers indicated
that they didn't want the property; and that the purchasers
inst ructed the sellers to sell the property and give them their
mone y back. Purchasers do not dispute the above but also
main tain that there was also discussion about moving the boundary
line so that the utility easement would not be within the property
to bre conveyed.
Often discovering the utility lines, the purchaser did not
3
make: further payment under the contract. However the purchaser did
pay a portion of the property tax,e& in November of 1984.
4. Neither party brought action for breach of contract (i.e. the
seller did not seek to enforce the provisions of the contract for
failure to make installment payments and purchaser did not
seek to enforce the provisions with respect to breach of
contract by creating an easement).

5. The sellers conveyed the property to third parties on December
27, 1985. This deed was recorded with the Duchesne County
Recorder on January 6, 1986. The property has not been improved
since the original 1981 contract.
6. After the parties discussion concerning taxes in November of
1984 they did not again discuss this transaction until the commencement of this action. During that time, the purchaser visited the
property site at least four times. However, there was apparently
nothing at the property site whichjwould indicate that the property
had been resold.
7. Generally the granting of a utility easement creates an
encumbrance upon the property which can not be cured. In
this case, a cause of action for breach of the contractual
covenant not to create such easements would arise upon discovery of
the easement in 1984. In this case the purchaser claims that the
cause of action would not arise until the deed was to be conveyed
upon full payment of the purchaselprice.
However, because the
purchaser did not continue to make payment it is clear that they
elected to treat the existence ofythe easement as an immediate
breach of the contract rather than to continue to make payments in
the hope that the encumbrance could be cured. Therefore, under
general principals of law the cause of action for breach would have
existed by July of 1984, and six year statute would have expired
prior to the filing of this action in August of 1991.
8. However, in this case there is an i s s ue,_.a s - to whether, the
partTes entered iTito an agreementT~wherein the sellers would resell
th^—propexty—and retuTrT"the^~ohXes which^urchaser trad"~paTdT From
ttre^f-atrts—i-n-^this'^crase it is cl~ea~r~ that the parties intended that
the purchaser would continue to have some interest in the property,
after July of 1984. This is evidenced by the request of the sellers
that the purchasers help pay the property tax payments in November
of 1984, and, arguably by the failure of the sellers to enforce the
contract provision which required installment payments. The
record is not clear as to whetherjthe parties entered into an
agreement to resell the property or whether the sellers otherwise
caused purchasers to reasonably believe that the property would be
sold and the payments refunded.
9. If the sellers lead the purchasers to reasonably believe that
the property. would be sold and that the payments would be returned,
there exists an issue as to f raucjjeither at the time of the
discussion in 1984 or fraud in the concealment of the sale.
10. If the parties agreed that the property would be resold
and the payments returned, that cause of action would not arise
until the sale was made and the sellers did not return the
payments. When fraud ia alleged, the cause of action may be
tolled
until the purchasers discovered the property had been

resold, or with reasonable diligence would have discovered the sale
of the property. In this case the purchasers did not discover
the sale until 1990. Therefore, if there was fraud in concealing
the sale the Statute of Limitations may not have run.
11. The court will hold that the cause of action for breach under
the original contract has run. Absent a further agreement to
adjust the boundaries or to return the payments (or sellers
actions which reasonably lead the purchasers to believe that the
parties would adjust the boundaries or return payments), the
statute of limitations has run on purchasers cause of action.
However, the facts which have been presented to the court are not
sufficient for the court to rule on Xhe legal affect of the parties
discussions after the breach was discovered. The court can not
rule as a matter of law that there was no fraud.
12. In ruling on the above the court has obviously not accepted the
filing of the deed to the third party purchasers in 1986 as notice
as a matter of law. The filing of this notice however may be
relevant to the issue of whether the purchaser should have
discovered the sale by the use of reasonable diligence prior to
December of 1990.
13. While it is not necessary for the court to rule on the affect
of the claimed change of $20.50 in 1986 the court is having
difficulty understanding how this unilateral action on the part of
the sellers could affect the purchasers cause of action for breach
of the warranty of title. Often an acceptance of part payment may
affect the timing of the sellers cause of action for breach of
contract with respect to installment payments, but not the
purchasers cause of action.
Nevertheless, the court does not rule
upon this issue at this time.
Based upon the foregoing the Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
Dated this X / day of September, 1992.

District Court Judge
ALP:mbp

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed by first class mail a true copy of the
foregoing ruling to Michael J. Petro, 101 East 200 South, Springville,
Utah 84663 and Arthur H. Nielsen, Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Tower, 60 East
South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 by depositing in the U. S. Mail
this <pdyi day of September, 1992.

(km /rn jtOZcirncA
D i s t r i c t Court

Clerk

Arthur H. Nielsen (2405)

•96 JUL 10 ^8 2 8

NIELSEN & SENIOR

Eagle Gate Tower, Suite 1100
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
Clark R. Nielsen
HENWOD& NIELSEN
Eagle Gate Tower, Suite 1160
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-0591
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ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
m^mmmmKSSSsssSsmmmmmmmmmsssssssssssjmmmmmmmmSKBSSBSXSXmi

T. ROBERT CORDNER and GLORIA
CORDNER,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
DARRELL L. ROSS and CLELLA C.
ROSS,.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Civil No. 91CV125D
The Honorable John R. Anderson

Defendants.
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came before the above Court on
Monday, June 18, 1996 at 1:45 p.m. for argument and detcimination; the Plaintiffs were
represented by their attorney, Michael Petro, who appeared with the Plaintiff Robert
Cordner; the Defendants were represented by Arthur H. Nielsen, Nielsen & Senior and by
Clark R. Nielsen, Henriod & Nielsen, who appeared with Defendant Darrell Ross.

After hearing the arguments of counsel, and having reviewed and considered the
memoranda and affidavits filed herein, the depositions of the Plaintiff Robert Cordner,
the Memorandum Decision dated September 14,1992, and all other documents and
pleadings filed herein, the Court makes the following determinations:
The underlying facts relevant to Defendants' motion for summary judgment are
undisputed. To the extent there is any disputed, relevant fact, the Court views the
evidence in light most favorable to the Plaintiffs. The relevant facts are that the Plaintiffs
and Defendants entered into two uniform real estate contracts in June 1981 and December
1982; in breach of those contracts, Defendants gave an easement across the property in
March or April 1984; Plaintiff Robert Cordner was personally aware of the easement and
breach in July 1984, when he told Defendant Darrell Ross that Ross had breached his
contract with the Plaintiffs. At that time, Mr. Cordner demanded his payments back. At
that time, Defendant Ross offered to adjust the boundaries to the property being sold but
no agreement was reached between the parties to do so or to return any payments made.
After Mr. Cordner treated the contracts as breached by Defendants, Plaintiff did not take
any legal action to enforce his rights or seek legal redress until August 1991. As a result,
Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract, Causes I and II of the Amended Complaint, are
barred by the six-year statute of limitation for actions on a written contract, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-23.

2

Plaintiffs also claim that they were defrauded or lulled into inaction by the offer of
Defendant DaiTell Ross in July 1984 to change the boundaries and to get back to
Plaintiffs regarding that offer. The parties were then on an equal footing and neither had
any advantage over the other. There was neither any agreement between the parties to
return any payments nor promise by Defendant Ross to change the boundaries. There is
no evidence that the Defendants concealed any claim or fact from the Plaintiff or made
any false representation that rises to the level of fraud. To the extent Plaintiffs claim the
statute of limitations is tolled because they were lulled into inaction on their claims by the
promise o£ l TU get back to you," the Court determines that any reliance thereon for over
seven years was unreasonable and does not excuse Plaintiffs* failure to act within the
period of the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs' failure to institute a legal action for over
seven years was not reasonable or excusable neglect, based upon the undisputed facts in
this case.
Although the result may appear to be unequitable based upon the amounts Mr.
Cordner claims he has paid on the contracts, there is no reason not to apply the statutes of
limitations when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs. Under
any theory for recovery advanced in Plaintiffs' amended complaint or in their argument in
opposition to summary judgment, the statute of limitations has run and the Plaintiffs'
claims have expired.

3

The Court independently concludes there is no evidence or factual allegation of
any wrongdoing by the Defendant Clella Ross beyond any claim for breach of contract by
giving the easement. As discussed, such claim is bailed by the statute of limitations.
Clella Ross is independently entitled to dismissal of all claims against her.
After considering the entire record herein, and based upon the forgoing
determinations, and good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment be and is hereby GRANTED. For the reasons set forth
herein and those stated by the court in its oral ruling, summary judgment is hereby
entered in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' complaint and
each of Plaintiffs' claims therein are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
Dated this /S^Hiay of July, 1996.

: Honorable John R. Anderson
District Judge
Seventh Judicial District Court
Approved as to form:

Attorney for Plamtiffs

AtieHfey for Defendants

